Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26254 
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dc.contributor.authorBiancini, Saraen
dc.date.accessioned2008-02-20-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:29:37Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:29:37Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26254-
dc.description.abstractWe consider the regulation of national firms in a common market. Regulators can influence the production of national firms but they incur in a positive cost of public funds. First, we show that market integration is welfare improving if and only if the efficiency gains compensate for the negative public finance effect (related to business stealing). We also show that supranational competition can have very different consequences on the rent seeking behaviour of firms, depending on cost correlation and ex-ante technological risk. Finally, we characterize the global optimum and show how it can be sustained in a decentralized bargaining solution.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2209en
dc.subject.jelL43en
dc.subject.jelL51en
dc.subject.jelF15en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordregulationen
dc.subject.keywordcompetitionen
dc.subject.keywordmarket integrationen
dc.subject.keywordcost of public fundsen
dc.subject.stwMarktintegrationen
dc.subject.stwRegulierungen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben
dc.subject.stwMakroökonomischer Einflussen
dc.subject.stwGesamtwirtschaftliches Anlagevermögenen
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleRegulating national firms in a common market-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn558657346en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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