Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/262361 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
LawFin Working Paper No. 40
Verlag: 
Goethe University, Center for Advanced Studies on the Foundations of Law and Finance (LawFin), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
The ECB is independent, but it is also accountable to the European parliament (EP). Yet, how the EP has held the ECB accountable has largely been overlooked. This paper starts addressing this gap by providing descriptive statistics of three accountability modalities. The paper highlights three findings. First, topics of accountability have changed. Climaterelated accountability has increased quickly and dramatically since 2017. Second, if the relationship between price stability and climate change remains an object of conflict among MEPs, a majority within the EP has emerged to put pressure for the ECB to take a more active stance against climate change, precisely on behalf of its price stability mandate. Third, MEPs engage with the climate topic in very specific ways. There is a gender divide between the climate and the price stability topics. Women engage more actively with climate-related topics. While the Greens heavily dominate the climate topic, parties from the Right dominate the topic of Price stability. Finally, MEPs adopt a more united strategy and a particularly low confrontational tone in their climate-related interventions.
Schlagwörter: 
accountability
European Central Bank
European Parliament
climate
price stability
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
2.79 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.