Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/261898 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] BRQ Business Research Quarterly [ISSN:] 2340-9436 [Volume:] 24 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Sage Publishing [Place:] London [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 174-191
Publisher: 
Sage Publishing, London
Abstract: 
This study offers insight into the role of board politicization on the Spanish cajas' performance from a dual perspective. First, we analyze the effect of a new kind of political directors who occupy board seats as representatives of stakeholders outside the public administrations while maintaining a political affiliation. We call these "hidden" political directors as politicians in disguise. Second, we analyze how political interests can prevent directors with financial expertise from applying their knowledge to improve cajas' performance. Using a sample of hand-collected data from 45 Spanish cajas, we find that politicians in disguise destroy value in the caja and that politically motivated financial experts on the board do not benefit cajas' performance.
Subjects: 
Board composition
cajas
financial experience
politicians
savings banks
JEL: 
G34
G21
G28
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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