Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26111 
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dc.contributor.authorOgilvie, Sheilaghen
dc.date.accessioned2007-12-21-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:16:04Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:16:04Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26111-
dc.description.abstractInstitutions - the structures of rules and norms governing economic transactions - are widely assigned a central role in economic development. Yet economic history is still dominated by the belief that institutions arise and survive because they are economically efficient. This paper shows that alternative explanations of institutions - particularly those incorporating distributional effects - are consistent with economic theory and supported by empirical findings. Distributional conflicts provide a better explanation than efficiency for the core economic institutions of pre-industrial Europe - serfdom, the community, the craft guild, and the merchant guild. The paper concludes by proposing four desiderata for any future economic theory of institutions.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2066en
dc.subject.jelN01en
dc.subject.jelN43en
dc.subject.jelO17en
dc.subject.jelO43en
dc.subject.jelP48en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwInstitutionalismusen
dc.subject.stwVerteilungskonflikten
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftsgeschichteen
dc.subject.stwEuropaen
dc.titleWhatever is, is right?: Economic institutions in pre-industrial Europe (Tawney lecture 2006)-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn555835936en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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