Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26111
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dc.contributor.authorOgilvie, Sheilaghen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-12-21en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:16:04Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:16:04Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26111-
dc.description.abstractInstitutions - the structures of rules and norms governing economic transactions - are widely assigned a central role in economic development. Yet economic history is still dominated by the belief that institutions arise and survive because they are economically efficient. This paper shows that alternative explanations of institutions - particularly those incorporating distributional effects - are consistent with economic theory and supported by empirical findings. Distributional conflicts provide a better explanation than efficiency for the core economic institutions of pre-industrial Europe - serfdom, the community, the craft guild, and the merchant guild. The paper concludes by proposing four desiderata for any future economic theory of institutions.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper|x2066en_US
dc.subject.jelN01en_US
dc.subject.jelN43en_US
dc.subject.jelO17en_US
dc.subject.jelO43en_US
dc.subject.jelP48en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwInstitutionalismusen_US
dc.subject.stwVerteilungskonflikten_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftsgeschichteen_US
dc.subject.stwEuropaen_US
dc.titleWhatever is, is right?: Economic institutions in pre-industrial Europe (Tawney lecture 2006)en_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn555835936en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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