Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260720 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] IZA World of Labor [ISSN:] 2054-9571 [Article No.:] 486 [Publisher:] Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) [Place:] Bonn [Year:] 2021
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
Labor market institutions that may weaken workers' bargaining leverage have received increased scrutiny in recent years. One example is noncompete agreements, which prevent workers from freely moving across employers, potentially weakening earnings growth. New data sources and empirical evidence have led policymakers to consider sharp restrictions on their use, especially among lower-income workers. These restrictions take many different forms, each of which has unique tradeoffs between the desire to protect workers while allowing firms to use noncompetes in cases where they may create social value.
Subjects: 
noncompete agreements
employment law
wages
job mobility
JEL: 
J30
J41
J42
J68
K31
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Article

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