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dc.contributor.authorPriks, Mikaelen
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-26-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:15:21Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:15:21Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26053-
dc.description.abstractRecent empirical work shows that judicial dependence can explain high levels of corruption. This paper examines how the dependence of judiciaries influences corruption at different levels of the government in a model where the central government, low-level officials, and the judiciary are corrupt. In the model, the central government sells offices to low-level officials and demands ex-post payments enforced by the judiciary. Because an independent judiciary can rule against the central authority and accept bribes from stealing low-level officials, it reduces corruption at the higher level of government but promotes corruption at the lower level. Therefore, even if highly corrupt, an independent judiciary may reduce total corruption. We provide empirical evidence which is in line with this result.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2008en
dc.subject.jelH11en
dc.subject.jelK40en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwJustizen
dc.subject.stwSelbstverwaltungen
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen
dc.subject.stwKonzessionen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleJudiciaries in corrupt societies-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn53829146Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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