Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26041
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Amegashie, J. Atsu | en |
dc.contributor.author | Ouattara, Bazoumana | en |
dc.contributor.author | Strobl, Eric | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-07-25 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-07-28T08:15:13Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-07-28T08:15:13Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26041 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of a donor's choice of the composition of unrestricted and in-kind/restricted transfers to a recipient and how this composition is adjusted in response to changes in the moral hazard behavior of the recipient. In-kind or restricted transfers may be used, among others, to control a recipient's moral hazard behavior but may be associated with deadweight losses. Within the context of foreign aid, we use a canonical political agency model to construct a simple signaling game between a possibly corrupt politician in a recipient country and a donor to illustrate the donor's optimal choice of tied (restricted) and untied foreign aid. We clarify the condition under which a reduction in the recipient's moral hazard behavior (i.e., improvement in the level of governance) leads to a fall in the proportion of tied aid. We test the predictions of our theoretical analysis using data on the composition of foreign aid by multilateral and bilateral donors. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x1996 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D73 | en |
dc.subject.jel | F35 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H87 | en |
dc.subject.jel | I38 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.stw | Entwicklungshilfekonditionen | en |
dc.subject.stw | Internationale Wirtschaftshilfe | en |
dc.subject.stw | Governance-Ansatz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Moral Hazard | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Moral hazard and the composition of transfers: theory with an application to foreign aid | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 538184124 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
Datei(en):
Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.