Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/26025 
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dc.contributor.authorPagano, Marcoen
dc.contributor.authorImmordino, Giovannien
dc.date.accessioned2007-07-25-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:15:01Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:15:01Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/26025-
dc.description.abstractWe study regulation of the auditing profession in a model where audit quality is unobservable and enforcing regulation is costly. The optimal audit standard falls short of the first-best audit quality, and is increasing in the riskiness of firms and in the amount of funding they seek. The model can encompass collusion between clients and auditors, arising from the joint provision of auditing and consulting services: deflecting collusion requires less ambitious standards. Finally, banning the provision of consulting services by auditors eliminates collusion but may not be optimal in the presence of economies of scope.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1980en
dc.subject.jelG28en
dc.subject.jelK22en
dc.subject.jelM42en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftsprüferrechten
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftsprüfungen
dc.subject.stwInformationswerten
dc.subject.stwDienstleistungsqualitäten
dc.subject.stwLieferanten-Kunden-Beziehungen
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensberatungen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbsbeschränkungen
dc.subject.stwRechtsdurchsetzungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleOptimal regulation of auditing-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn538175702en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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