Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260212 
Year of Publication: 
2017
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2017:3
Publisher: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Abstract: 
Outcomes in social dilemmas often have a stochastic component. We report experimental findings from public good games with both correlated and independent risk across players. We find that the presence of both types of risk prevents the decay of cooperation typically observed in the standard deterministic public good game. The results further suggest that it is greater relative importance of social norms or warm glow giving, rather than risk sharing opportunities that foster cooperation in our stochastic public good game.
Subjects: 
risk pooling
risk sharing
social norms
linear public goods game
cooperation decay
stable cooperation
JEL: 
D03
D80
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.