Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260140 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2014:44
Publisher: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Abstract: 
This paper studies an allocation problem with multiple assignments, indivisible objects, no endowments and no monetary transfers, where a single object may be assigned to several agents as long as the set of agents assigned the object satisfy a compatibility constraint. It is shown that, on the domain of complete, transitive and strict preferences, group-sorting sequential dictatorships are fully characterized by four different combinations of coalitional strategyproofness, strategyproofness, Pareto efficiency, non-bossiness, group-monotonicity and group-invariance. It is also demonstrated that the characterization in Pápai (2001) of sequential dictatorships for the case where assignments are not allowed to overlap is contained in the main result.
Subjects: 
Multiple assignments
overlapping assignments
sequential dictatorship
strategyproofness
compatibility
JEL: 
D61
D63
D71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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