Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260131 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2014:35
Publisher: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Abstract: 
We consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains, and observe that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via agent-k-linked allocations. Given this observation, we provide an algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations.
Subjects: 
least manipulable envy-free rules
algorithm
JEL: 
C71
C78
D63
D71
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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