Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260121 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2014:24
Publisher: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Abstract: 
Price controls are used in many regulated markets and well recognized as the cause of market inefficiency. This paper examines a practical housing market in the presence of price controls and provides a solution to the problem of how houses should be efficiently allocated among agents through a system of prices. We demonstrate that the dynamic auction by Talman and Yang (2008) always finds a core allocation in finitely many iterations, thus resulting in a Pareto efficient outcome.
Subjects: 
Ascending auction
assignment market
price control
Pareto efficiency
core
JEL: 
C71
D44
D47
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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