Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/260035 
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2012:8
Publisher: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Abstract: 
We consider envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In "small" economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this result we find the envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rules which are least manipulable for each preference profile in terms of any agent's maximal gain. If preferences are quasi-linear, then we can find an envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rule such that for any problem, the maximal utility gain from manipulation is equalized among all agents.
Subjects: 
(Least) Manipulability
Envy-freeness
Budget-Balance
Indivisibilities.
JEL: 
C71
C78
D63
D71
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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