Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/259975 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2009:16
Verlag: 
Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Lund
Zusammenfassung: 
The make-or-buy decision is analyzed in a simple framework combining contractual incompleteness with the existence of imperfect but contractible performance measures. Contractual incompleteness gives rise to two regimes, identified with make and buy. The performance measure on which comprehensive contracts can be written is imperfect in the sense of being subject to manipulation. The main result is that the impact – or "externality" – of manipulation on true performance is key; a positive (negative) such externality favors make (buy).
Schlagwörter: 
make-or-buy decision
manipulation
outsourcing
JEL: 
D23
L22
L24
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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