Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/25853 
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dc.contributor.authorDreher, Axelen
dc.contributor.authorSturm, Jan-Egberten
dc.contributor.authorVreeland, James Raymonden
dc.date.accessioned2006-10-11-
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-28T08:12:56Z-
dc.date.available2009-07-28T08:12:56Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/25853-
dc.description.abstractWe investigate whether temporary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the IMF, using panel data for 191 countries over the period 1951 to 2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary UN Security Council membership and participation in IMF programs, even after accounting for economic and political factors, as well as regional and country effects, and duration dependence. There is also evidence that UNSC membership reduces the number of conditions included in IMF programs. The size of the loan, however, is not affected by UNSC membership.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x1808en
dc.subject.jelF33en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwNationalstaaten
dc.subject.stwRegierungen
dc.subject.stwMitgliedschaften
dc.subject.stwInternationale Organisationen
dc.subject.stwAnpassungsprogramm des IWFen
dc.subject.stwWelten
dc.titleDoes membership on the UN security council influence IMF decisions?: evidence from panel data-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn51858688Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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