Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/257670 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] International Journal of Financial Studies [ISSN:] 2227-7072 [Volume:] 8 [Issue:] 1 [Article No.:] 2 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 1-15
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
Internet finance is a new form of finance that applies capacities found on the Internet to the traditional financial industry. However, at the present stage, internet finance is faced with many problems, such as overly rapid development and non-standard operation. This paper adopted the evolutionary game theory as the analysis tool to design an evolutionary game model of government audit supervision of Internet finance, and analyzed the evolutionary stability of the strategies used by Internet financial institutions and government financial audit supervision departments. A simulation calculation was carried out by placing the calculation experimental method "Scenario-Coping", which simulated the initial probability of different strategies adopted by both parties of the game and evaluated the influence of changing the penalty intensity of Internet financial institutions' violation on the outcome of the evolutionary game. Based on the simulation analysis, the paper provided policy suggestions on strengthening audit supervision and promoting its sustainable development from three aspects: strengthening the construction of the Internet financial credit information system, improving Internet financial laws and regulations, and improving the early warning level of Internet financial credit risk.
Subjects: 
computing experiment
evolutionary game
government auditing
internet finance
system simulation
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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