Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/257451 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 11 [Issue:] 3 [Article No.:] 33 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 1-20
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
Lower one- or two-dimensional coordination, or potential games, are popularly used to model interactive behavior, such as innovation diffusion and cultural evolution. Typically, this involves determining the "better" of competing solutions. However, examples have demonstrated that different measures of a "good" choice can lead to conflicting conclusions; a fact that reflects the history of game theory in equilibrium selection. This behavior is totally explained while extending the analysis to the full seven-dimensional class of potential games, which includes coordination games.
Subjects: 
externalities
decomposition
innovation diffusion
payoff dominance
potential games
risk dominance
social welfare
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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