Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/257441 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 11 [Issue:] 2 [Article No.:] 22 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 1-14
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
We analyze a vertically differentiated market for an imperfectly durable good served by a monopolist in an infinite-horizon, discrete-time game. Our goal is to identify the Markov perfect stationary equilibria where the seller can maintain his monopoly power. We establish that the set of parameters supporting a monopoly outcome is larger when the seller offers different quality versions of the same product. Hence, our results suggest that, when the innate durability of a product is high, the seller should offer different quality versions of the product.
Subjects: 
differentiation
durable goods
monopoly
pricing
quality
JEL: 
C73
C78
L12
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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