Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/256763 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 296
Publisher: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Abstract: 
Reporting private information is a key part of economic decision making. A recent literature has found that many people have a preference for honest reporting, contrary to usual economic assumptions. In this paper, we investigate whether preferences for honesty are malleable and what determines them. We experimentally measure preferences for honesty in a sample of children. As our main result, we provide causal evidence on the effect of the social environment by randomly enrolling children in a year-long mentoring programme. We find that, about four years after the end of the programme, mentored children are significantly more honest.
Subjects: 
honesty
lying
truth-telling
formation of preferences
experiments with children
JEL: 
C90
D90
D64
D82
H26
J13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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