Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253594 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Quantitative Economics [ISSN:] 1759-7331 [Volume:] 12 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1021-1051
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
We experimentally implement a dynamic public-good problem, where the public good in question is the dynamically evolving information about agents' common state of the world. Subjects' behavior is consistent with free-riding because of strategic concerns. We also find that subjects adopt more complex behaviors than predicted by the welfare-optimal equilibrium, such as noncut-off behavior, lonely pioneers, and frequent switches of action.
Subjects: 
dynamic games
Dynamic public-good problem
exponential bandits
laboratory experiments
learning
strategic experimentation
JEL: 
C73
C92
D83
O32
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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