Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/250492 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 14831
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
I conduct a discrete-choice experiment with responses linked to administrative teacher and student records to examine teacher preferences for compensation structure and working conditions. I calculate willingness-to-pay for a rich set of work attributes. High-performing teachers have similar preferences to other teachers, but they have stronger preferences for performance pay. Taking the preference estimates at face value I explore how schools should structure compensation to meet various objectives. Under each objective, schools appear to underpay in salary and performance pay while overpaying in retirement. Restructuring compensation can increase both teacher welfare and student achievement.
Subjects: 
teacher labor markets
compensation structure
teacher quality
JEL: 
I20
J32
J45
M50
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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