Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/250429 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 14768
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We study how distributional preferences are affected by a major property rights reform that transformed informal use-rights over land traditionally characterizing rural Beninese villages in a system akin to private ownership. The design combines the randomized control-trial implementation of the reform across villages with lab-in-the-field experiments eliciting villagers' distributional choices – both when luck is the source of situational inequality and when an unequal distribution is originated by merit considerations. Results show that reforming allocation rules in the direction of impersonal market-alike institutions increases participants' acceptance of inequality determined by luck, while leaving participants' tolerance for inequality generated by merit unaffected.
Subjects: 
fairness
institutional change
lab-in-the-field experiment
land tenure reform
land titling
JEL: 
D31
C93
D01
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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