Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/250311
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
Cardiff Economics Working Papers No. E2020/1
Publisher: 
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff
Abstract: 
I model the use of research specialization in hiring as a signal of ability. I demonstrate that rewarding for specialization can make an average non-specializing candidate on average better than average specializing candidate, and vice versa. Specialization works as a good ability signal only when both good and bad candidates are very likely to churn out good projects.
Subjects: 
specialization
research
job market
JEL: 
A11
D4
I23
J4
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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