Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249883 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers No. 660
Publisher: 
Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld
Abstract: 
Call a mechanism that associates each profile of preferences over candidates to an ambiguous act an Ambiguous Social Function (ASCF). This paper studies the strategy-proofness of ASCFs. We find that an ASCF is unanimous and strategyproof if and only if there exists a nonempty subset of voters, called the set of top voters, such that at each preference profile, the range of the selected act equals the set of top-ranked candidates of top voters. We provide a full characterization of the class of unanimous, strategyproof, and anonymous ASCFs, and provide a large subclass of ASCFs that satisfy the additional property of neutrality.
Subjects: 
Social Choice Function
Ambiguity Aversion
Ellsberg Urns
Strategy-proofness
Unanimity
Anonymity
Neutrality
JEL: 
D71
D72
D81
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Working Paper

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