Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249698 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Series/Report no.: 
ILE Working Paper Series No. 57
Publisher: 
University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE), Hamburg
Abstract: 
This article introduces a novel database that measures governments' compliance with national constitutions. It combines information on de jure constitutional rules with data on their de facto implementation. The individual compliance indicators can be grouped into four categories that we aggregate into an overall indicator of constitutional compliance: property rights and the rule of law, political rights, civil rights, and basic human rights. The database covers 168 countries over the period 1900 to 2020 and can be used by researchers interested in studying the determinants or the effects of (non)compliance with constitutions. Our investigation of the stylized facts of constitutional compliance does not reveal a long-term trend toward more compliance. Parliamentary democracies are the regimes with the highest level of constitutional compliance, whereas military dictatorships perform the worst. Although compliance is not determined by a constitution's breadth, constitutional design does still matter. Constitutions that allow for the dismissal of the head of state or government for violating the constitution achieve higher compliance levels.
Subjects: 
constitutional compliance
constitutional economics
constitutional political economy
de jure-de facto gap
executive constraints
governance indicators
measurement of institutions
JEL: 
H11
K10
K38
K42
O57
P48
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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