Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249210 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Land Use Policy [ISSN:] 0264-8377 [Volume:] 114 [Article No.:] 105983 [Publisher:] Elsevier [Place:] Amsterdam [Year:] 2022
Publisher: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Abstract: 
This study examines whether decentralized auctioning of public agricultural land results in higher land prices in comparison to auctioning via a centralized agency. Decentralization reforms in Ukraine, first, mandated local governments to manage communal land and later transferred agricultural land in their jurisdictions. We compare the resulting land prices of centrally and locally organized auctions and evaluate whether land-use concentration affected auction outcomes. Using unique datasets on land auctions from 2014 to 2020, we find that land plots auctioned locally by rural municipalities generate more competitive land rental outcomes with higher land rental prices. In addition, land concentration is found to negatively affect land rental prices and auction markups. Based on the results, we discuss policy implications for the management of public agricultural land in weak institutional settings.
Subjects: 
public land
land auctions
hedonic pricing model
spatial model
Ukraine
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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