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dc.contributor.authorSchwager, Roberten
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T14:58:12Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T14:58:12Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24630-
dc.description.abstractA simple Tiebout model is presented where states provide university education to both immobile and mobile students. State governments choose the quality of public universities by trading off the value of education for the local immobile student population and the costs, net of tuition revenues, of running the university. The quality of education and the assignment of students to universities in an efficient allocation are characterised. It is shown that decentralised decisions result in efficient choices if states are allowed to choose tuition levels freely. If tuition is capped, ine?ciently low qualities are likely to arise.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x07-056en
dc.subject.jelH75en
dc.subject.jelH77en
dc.subject.jelI28en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordhigher educationen
dc.subject.keywordmigrationen
dc.subject.keywordfiscal externalityen
dc.subject.keywordclub gooden
dc.subject.keywordtuitionen
dc.subject.stwHochschuleen
dc.subject.stwStudienfinanzierungen
dc.subject.stwTeilstaaten
dc.subject.stwStudierendeen
dc.subject.stwInstitutioneller Wettbewerben
dc.subject.stwKlubtheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titlePublic Universities, Tuition and Competition: A Tiebout Model-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn546257879en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:6653en

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