Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/245646 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 14595
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We study, theoretically and empirically, the effects of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents to produce a social good. Agents join teams where they allocate effort to either generate individual monetary rewards (selfish effort) or contribute to the production of a social good with positive effort complementarities (social effort). Agents differ in their motivation to exert social effort. Our model predicts that lowering incentives for selfish effort in one team increases social good production by selectively attracting and coordinating motivated agents. We test this prediction in a lab experiment allowing us to cleanly separate the selection effect from other effects of low incentives. Results show that social good production more than doubles in the low-incentive team, but only if self-selection is possible. Our analysis highlights the important role of incentives in the matching of motivated agents engaged in social good production.
Schlagwörter: 
incentives
intrinsic motivation
self-selection
public service
JEL: 
C91
D90
J24
J31
M52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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