Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/245616 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 14565
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
Exploiting a quasi-natural experiment and using administrative data, we examine the effects of the return-to-work policies' clawback regime in Disability Insurance (DI) programs on beneficiaries' labor supply decisions, allowing them to collect reduced DI payments while working. We compare two return-to-work policies: one with a single rate clawback regime and another with a progressive clawback regime where a reform further increased its progressiveness. The reform caused an increase in the mean labor supply; beneficiaries who already work, work more, and those who did not work start working. The effects are heterogeneous by beneficiaries characteristics, and the increase is driven mainly by top percentiles of earnings. Findings suggest an essential role for the clawback regime in return-to-work policies and targeted policies to increase the labor supply in DI programs.
Subjects: 
disability insurance
clawback rate
return-to-work policy
financial incentives
labor supply
JEL: 
D3
H3
I3
J3
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
2.84 MB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.