Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/242910 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IFS Working Paper No. W21/11
Verlag: 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), London
Zusammenfassung: 
We quantify how bargaining power is distributed when spouses make financial decisions together. We build a model in which each spouse has a risk preference and must bargain with each other to make asset decisions for the household. By structurally estimating the model with longitudinal data from Australian households, we show that the average household's asset allocation reflects the husband's risk preference 44% more than the wife's. This gap in bargaining power is partially explained by gender differences in income and employment status, but is also due to gender effects. We provide further evidence that links the distribution of bargaining power to views on gender norms in the cross-section.
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