Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/242522
Authors: 
Lu, Yuanzhu
Poddar, Sougata
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 2013/08
Abstract: 
We show that a two-part tariff licensing contract is always optimal to the insider patentee in spatial models irrespective of the size of the innovation or any pre-innovation cost asymmetries. The result provides a simple justification of the prevalence of two-part tariff licensing contracts in industries.
Subjects: 
Salop Model
Hotelling Model
Costs
Innovation
PAtent Licensing
JEL: 
D43
D45
L13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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