Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/242450 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2021: Climate Economics
Publisher: 
ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Kiel, Hamburg
Abstract: 
This paper compares the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement in the dynamic game of Battaglini and Harstad (2016). The asymmetric Nash solution of this game reflects the Paris Agreement, whereas the symmetric Nash solution reflects the Kyoto Protocol. In a large set of economies, the Kyoto Protocol is Pareto superior to the Paris Agreement. Although the stable climate coalition is large in the Paris Agreement and small in the Kyoto Protocol, the emissions reductions of a single coalition country are much more pronounced in the Kyoto Protocol, so that this per-country-emissions-reduction effect outweighs the disadvantageous coalition-size effect.
Subjects: 
pledge and review
emissions
investments
stable coalition
JEL: 
C71
F55
Q54
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.