Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/241826 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] China Journal of Accounting Research [ISSN:] 1755-3091 [Volume:] 13 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Elsevier [Place:] Amsterdam [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 387-404
Publisher: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Abstract: 
Agencies can reduce problems by adopting a governance structure of multiple large shareholders. However, multiple large shareholders may collude, thereby reducing the behavior that can create long-term value for the company. This paper uses a sample of companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges between 2008 and 2017 to investigate the relationship between multiple large shareholders and corporate environmental protection investment (CEPI). We find that multiple large shareholders will significantly reduce CEPI. Specifically, external supervision and a company's ownership structure affect the relationship between multiple large shareholders and CEPI. In addition, after participating in SOEs, non-state-owned shareholders will significantly improve CEPI of SOEs.
Subjects: 
Multiple large shareholders
Corporate environmental protection investment
SOEs
Ownership structure
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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