Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/241807 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Citation: 
[Journal:] China Journal of Accounting Research [ISSN:] 1755-3091 [Volume:] 12 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Elsevier [Place:] Amsterdam [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 411-430
Publisher: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Abstract: 
Few studies have focused on the role of non-CEO top manager inside directors in corporate governance, especially in the context of emerging countries. Despite their tendency to be subject to CEOs, non-CEO top manager inside directors can counterbalance CEOs in specific situations. Using panel data on state-owned listed companies in China, we conduct an empirical study of how non-CEO top manager inside directors influence CEO pay-performance sensitivity under serious agency conflicts. We find that the proportion of non-CEO top manager inside directors is significantly negatively correlated with CEO pay-performance sensitivity in state-owned enterprises, whereas the shareholding proportion of the controlling shareholders weakens this relationship. Furthermore, we find that non-CEO top manager inside directors significantly increase executives' on-the-job consumption. Our conclusions are robust to endogeneity testing and alternative specifications. Few studies have focused on the role of non-CEO top manager inside directors in corporate governance, especially in the context of emerging countries. Despite their tendency to be subject to CEOs, non-CEO top manager inside directors can counterbalance CEOs in specific situations. Using panel data on state-owned listed companies in China, we conduct an empirical study of how non-CEO top manager inside directors influence CEO pay-performance sensitivity under serious agency conflicts. We find that the proportion of non-CEO top manager inside directors is significantly negatively correlated with CEO pay-performance sensitivity in state-owned enterprises, whereas the shareholding proportion of the controlling shareholders weakens this relationship. Furthermore, we find that non-CEO top manager inside directors significantly increase executives' on-the-job consumption. Our conclusions are robust to endogeneity testing and alternative specifications.
Subjects: 
Inside directors
State-owned enterprises
Non-CEO top managers
Pay-performance sensitivity
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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