Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/241773 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Citation: 
[Journal:] China Journal of Accounting Research [ISSN:] 1755-3091 [Volume:] 11 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Elsevier [Place:] Amsterdam [Year:] 2018 [Pages:] 91-127
Publisher: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Abstract: 
Using novel data on independent directors' opinions in China, we investigate the stock and labor market effects prompted by independent directors publicly saying "no" to major board decisions. We find that the market reacts negatively to modified director opinions, but positively to firms interlocked with the directors who said "no." We further find substantial turnover and decline in board seats after independent directors issue modified opinions. Overall, we identify a dilemma in China whereby the labor market does not reward vigilant directors for standing up to firm insiders, although investors add a premium to effective board monitoring.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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