Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/241209 
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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper No. 2020-43
Verlag: 
Bank of Canada, Ottawa
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies the role of voluntary disclosure in crowding out independent research about firm value. In the model, when inside firm owners make it easier for outside investors to obtain inexpensive biased information from the manager, investors rely less on costly unbiased research. As a result, managers are tempted to manipulate the firm stock price more, but investors are better informed because they anticipate manager manipulation. An increase in stock-price informativeness, therefore, has to be traded off against an increase inresources wasted on manipulation. I find that, surprisingly, firm owners grant investors more access to managers that manipulate more strongly. An implication is that the firm cost of capital is negatively related to manager manipulation.
Schlagwörter: 
Economic models
Financial markets
Recent economic and financial developments
JEL: 
D82
D86
G14
G32
G34
M12
M41
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Dokumentart: 
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