Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/24104
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Rincke, Johannes | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-02-16T14:48:51Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-02-16T14:48:51Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24104 | - |
dc.description.abstract | A simple model of yardstick competition between jurisdictions is presented.Governments of jurisdictions face the alternative to choose between an oldand a new policy with stochastic payoffs. The new policy is superior to theold policy in one state of the world, and inferior in the other. Governmentsare either benevolent, serving the interest of the voter, or rent-seeking. Anequilibrium with yardstick competition is shown to exist where bad governments having a good government in their neighborhood choose the new policy more often compared to an equilibrium without relative performance evaluation. Overall, the probability of policy innovations is increased by yardstickcompetition. The model has a testable empirical implication saying that policy innovations should show spatial correlation. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheim | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aZEW Discussion Papers |x05-11 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.stw | Yardstick Competition | en |
dc.subject.stw | Public Choice | en |
dc.title | Yardstick Competition and Policy Innovation | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 479723583 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:zewdip:2901 | en |
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.