Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/237793 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2021-060/VI
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
The literature offers two foundations for competitive search equilibrium, a Nash approach and a market-maker approach. When each buyer visits only one seller (or each worker makes only one job application), the two approaches are equivalent. However, when each buyer visits multiple sellers, this equivalence can break down. Our paper analyzes competitive search equilibrium with simultaneous search using the two approaches. We consider four cases defined by (i) the surplus structure (are the goods substitutes or complements?) and (ii) the mechanism space (do sellers post fees or prices?). With fees, the two approaches yield the same constrained efficient equilibrium. With prices, the equilibrium allocation is the same using both approaches if the goods are complements, but is not constrained efficient. In the case in which only prices are posted and the goods are substitutes, the equilibrium allocations from the two approaches are different.
Schlagwörter: 
multiple applications
competitive search
market makers
efficiency
JEL: 
C78
D44
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
562.83 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.