Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233947 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Public Economics [ISSN:] 0047-2727 [Volume:] 165 [Publisher:] Elsevier [Place:] Amsterdam [Year:] 2018 [Pages:] 160-169
Publisher: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Abstract: 
We examine determinants of immigration requirements in a public goods game experiment with endogenous groups. Initially, the game consists of in-group players who enjoy an existing public good and out-group players who may subsequently enter the group. Motivated by different current migration flows and anti-immigration sentiments, our treatments are crafted to investigate how migrants’ power of self-determination and public debate among in-group players shape immigration requirements. We employ the minimal group paradigm and immigration requirements are set by in-group voting. In order to immigrate, out-group players have to fulfill minimal contribution requirements. Public debate fosters coherence between the requirements and in-group players’ contributions if migrants are free to reject requirements. Conversely, public debate among in-group players fosters economic exploitation of migrants with less bargaining power. Overall the study illustrates the novel potential of applying well-established tools from experimental economics to migration questions.
Subjects: 
immigration
public good
endogenous groups
voting
experiment
JEL: 
C91
C92
H41
O15
Published Version’s DOI: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Accepted Manuscript (Postprint)

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