Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233251 
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper No. 35
Publisher: 
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE), Turku
Abstract: 
We study coalitional one-deviation principle in a framework a la Chwe (1994). The principle requires that an active coalition or any of its subcoalition will not benefit from a single deviation to a strategy that specifies, for each history of coalitional moves, an active coalition and its move. A strategy meeting the one-deviation property is characterized. Moreover, it is shown to exist. Finally, the results are compared to the existing theories of coalitional games.
Subjects: 
one-deviation principle
coalition formation
JEL: 
C71
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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