Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/232882 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 14130
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
The success of a country's anti-corruption policies can crucially depend on the citizens' beliefs about the existing legal environment. We test this key idea of Basu (2020) using a novel design which systematically manipulates beliefs of participants in an experiment. Our results suggest that Basu's "Republic of Beliefs" idea provides a critical insight in policy formulation; Merely introducing an anti-corruption law is not sufficient in aiding the country towards the desired equilibrium, especially in developing countries, where the existing legal enforcement machinery has severe scopes of leakages.
Subjects: 
republic of beliefs
asymmetric punishment
harassment bribery
experiment
JEL: 
C91
K42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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