Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/232619 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 13867
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
This paper analyses the heterogeneous effects of the decentralization of collective bargaining on the incidence of wage increases and wage dispersion in Finland. We use linked employer-employee panel data for the 2005-2013 period, which includes major changes in bargaining systems and economic conditions. Our regression results from models with high-dimensional individual and firm fixed effects show that decentralized bargaining leads to very different outcomes for blue- and white-collar employees. Decentralized bargaining decreases wage dispersion among blue-collar employees and slightly increases it among white-collar employees. Decentralization also affects the incidence of wage increases differently for blue- and white-collar employees. We argue that these differences reflect the different preferences of the employee groups. We also show that the fallback option in local negotiations affects the decentralization outcomes.
Subjects: 
decentralization
collective agreements
wage bargaining
wage increase
wage dispersion
JEL: 
J31
J51
J52
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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