Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23131
Authors: 
Kirstein, Roland
Cooter, Robert
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
CSLE Discussion Paper 2003-02
Abstract: 
The paper proposes a mechanism that may implement first-best effort in simultaneous teams. Within the framework of this mechanism, each team members is obliged to make a fixed, non-contingent payment, and chooses his individual effort. After the output is produced, each team member receives a gross payment that equals the actual team output. We demonstrate that a Nash equilibrium exists in which each team member chooses first-best effort. We call this mechanism ?Anti-Sharing? since it solves the sharing problem that causes the inefficiency in teams. The Anti-Sharing mechanism requires one player to specialize on the role of an ?Anti-Sharer?. With an external Anti-Sharer who works on a non-profit base, the mechanism can implement first-best effort. If, however, the Anti-Sharer comes from within the team and desires a positive payoff, then the mechanism may implement not more than second-best effort. The latter version of the model could be interpreted as a new theory of firms and partnerships in the sense of the theory of Alchian and Demsetz (1972).
Subjects: 
Efficient Effort in Teams
Second-Best Solution
Partnerships
JEL: 
C72
D23
M21
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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