Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23130
Authors: 
Neumärker, Karl Justus Bernhard
Pech, Gerald
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
CSLE Discussion Paper 2003-01
Abstract: 
Why does the government not defect from the constitution? This article focuses on the dynamic restraints the government faces under the rule of law: violations against unconstitutional laws are not punished under the constitution. If a violating government cannot commit itself never to reinstall the constitution enforcing an unconstitutional law becomes difficult. Citizens? expectations to go unpunished when not complying may be self-fulfilling. Deriving the equilibrium of a global game we show that this mechanism is effectively deterring a government from defecting from a constitutionally permissible tax rate.
Subjects: 
tax evasion
global games
selffulfilling expectations
dynamic policy restraints
JEL: 
H26
D7
E61
K42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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