Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/230414
Authors: 
Collie, David R.
Year of Publication: 
2018
Series/Report no.: 
Cardiff Economics Working Papers No. E2018/8
Abstract: 
Welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff is compared to free-trade welfare under perfect competition in the case of a large country able to affect its terms of trade; under Cournot duopoly with differentiated products; and under Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products. Under perfect competition, assuming linear demand and supply, welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff will be higher than free-trade welfare if the country has sufficient market power. Under Cournot duopoly and Bertrand duopoly, assuming linear demands and constant marginal costs, welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff is always higher than free-trade welfare.
Subjects: 
Maximum-Revenue Tariff
Free Trade
Perfect Competition
Cournot Oligopoly
Bertrand Oligopoly
JEL: 
F11
F12
F13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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