Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/229674
Authors: 
Zou, Zhengxing
van den Brink, Rene
Funaki, Yukihiko
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2020-054/II
Abstract: 
We introduce a family of values for TU-games that offers a compromise between the proportional and equal division values. Each value, called an alpha-mollified value, is obtained in two steps. First, a linear function with respect to the worths of all coalitions is defined which associates a real number to every TU-game. Second, the weight assigned by this function is used to weigh proportionality and equality principles in allocating the worth of the grand coalition. We provide an axiomatic characterization of this family, and show that this family contains the affine combinations of the equal division value and the equal surplus division value as the only linear values. Further, we identify the proportional division value and the affine combinations of the equal division value and the equal surplus division value as those members of this family, that satisfy projection consistency. Besides, we provide a procedural implementation of each single value in this family.
Subjects: 
Cooperative game
consistency
equal division value
proportional division value
JEL: 
C71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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