Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/227604 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
FORLand-Working Paper No. 21 (2020)
Publisher: 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, DFG Research Unit 2569 FORLand "Agricultural Land Markets - Efficiency and Regulation", Berlin
Abstract: 
In this paper, we test for the existence of a common component in agricultural land auctions in eastern Germany during the price boom 2007-2018 and discuss respective policy implications. Using a large, detailed dataset of auctions, we can rely on professional appraisals of the auctioned good that are privy to the seller to control for unobserved heterogeneity. We derive a new approach to disentangle valuations from observed and unobserved heterogeneity across auctions. For validation purposes we provide several model specifications; based on all models, we strongly reject purely private valuations. Based on the rich identification strategy, we conclude the existence of a common component in these auctions to be very likely. Our results first underline the importance of an adequate model specification to analyze farmland auctions. Second, from a policy perspective, the implied potential for a winner's curse can be seen as a warning sign for the sector.
Subjects: 
Farmland auctions
common values
unobserved heterogeneity
JEL: 
C57
D44
Q12
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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