Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/224761 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 256
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper we study the effects that loss contracts - prepayments that can be clawbacked later - have on group coordination when there is strategic uncertainty. We compare the choices made by experimental subjects in a minimum effort game. In control sessions, incentives are formulated as a classic gain contract, while in treatment sessions, incentives are framed as an isomorphic loss contract. Our results show that loss contracts reduce the minimum efforts of groups and worsen coordination between group members, both leading to lower payoffs. However, these results depend strongly on the group's gender composition; groups with a larger proportion of women are better at coordinating and exert more effort.
Schlagwörter: 
strategic uncertainty
loss aversion
coordination
contract design
framing
experiment
JEL: 
C91
D84
G11
G41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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