Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/223979
Authors: 
Lalive, Rafael
Magesan, Arvind
Staubli, Stefan
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 13537
Abstract: 
We exploit a unique Swiss reform to identify the importance of passivity, claiming social security benefits at the Full Retirement Age (FRA). Sharp discontinuities generated by the reform reveal that raising the FRA while imposing small early claiming penalties significantly delays pension claiming and retirement, but imposing large penalties and holding the FRA fixed does not. The nature of the reform allows us to identify that between 47 and 69% of individuals are passive, while imposing additional structure point identifies the fraction at 67%. An original survey of Swiss pensioners reveals that reference-dependent preferences is the main source of passivity.
Subjects: 
full retirement age
social security
regression discontinuity design
reference dependence
JEL: 
H55
J21
J26
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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