Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/223916
Authors: 
De Paola, Maria
Gioia, Francesca
Pupo, Valeria
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 13474
Abstract: 
In this paper we investigate whether the framing of the incentives used to foster participation into contexts characterized by high degrees of time pressure affects individuals' self-selection. At this aim we run a lab-in-the-field experiment structured in two parts. The first part investigates individual characteristics that affect performance under time pressure, while the second is devoted to analyze how the decision to work under time pressure is affected by the reward/punishment framing of incentives. We find that individuals characterized by a high degree of risk aversion perform worse under time pressure. Nonetheless, when facing a penalty incentive scheme these individuals are more likely to choose to work with strict term limits, suggesting that penalty contracts might generate adverse selection problems.
Subjects: 
time pressure
bonus
penalty
incentive schemes
framing
selection
lab-in-the-field experiment
JEL: 
C9
C91
D01
D91
J33
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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